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Article 5

Public Opinion, Cultural Change, and
Constitutional Adjudication
CALVIN MASSEY*

When do courtspay attention to public opinion in deciding constitutionalissues? When
should courts do so? This Article provides a limited answer to those questions. Courts
often pay attention to public opinion when deciding constitutional issues, especially
when the issue is one that involves a challenge to a long-standing cultural norm. That
pattern is present, for example, in each of Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of
Education. The Court changed its view of equal protection because public opinion
about racial segregation changed. Today, the long-standing cultural understanding of
marriage is challenged by those who claim that its perpetuation violates the equal
protection and due process guarantees. While nobody can predict with any certainty
what the judicial resolution of this issue may be, it should not be surprising if that
resolution reflects public opinion on the matter. Public opinion data on issues of
special concern to the homosexual community suggests that each of the legislative and
judicial responses at the state level reflects public opinion or, if anything, lags a bit
behind. But the courts catch up, and it is appropriatefor courts to consider public
opinion when weighing constitutional challenges to deeply embedded and longaccepted culturalpractices.

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
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There are two obvious aspects to any discussion of public opinion
and its influence on the judicial manufacture of constitutional law:
Should courts be influenced by public opinion? Are courts so influenced?
The short and cryptic answer to the first question is "sometimes." The
short, and less cryptic, answer to the second question is "most of the
time." Actually, Finley Peter Dunne, the American humorist of the early
twentieth century, had Mr. Dooley deliver a more trenchant verdict on
this latter issue: "No matter whether the Constitution follows the flag or
not, the Supreme Court follows the election returns."' Mr. Dooley's
description may well have been right, but he had no answer to the
question of whether courts should do so, nor even a general answer to
the question of when courts follow public opinion. I shall try to provide
some sharper answers to these questions in the context of the current
debate over governmental limits upon the ability of same-sex partners to
enter into marriage. Public opinion concerning the wisdom and legality
of confining marriage to opposite-sex partners is divided,2 and in the
course of deciding whether state limits upon same-sex marriage are valid,
the courts will necessarily be required to confront the question of what
role, if any, public opinion will play in their decisions.
In a series of three lectures delivered shortly before his death,
Justice Robert Jackson reminded his audience that the Supreme Court is
a unit of government, a law court, and a political institution. This
observation is also true of the highest courts of appeal of the several
states with respect to matters of state constitutional law that do not
implicate federal law. It is the lot of those courts to resolve matters with
finality. "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible
only because we are final," declared Justice Jackson.' His reflections
serve to focus the problem of judicial consideration of public opinion.
Because courts are final (including state supreme courts, which are final
on matters of state law that are independent of federal law) and
constitute a branch of government, public opinion is relevant to their
decisions, as it is to all questions of governance in a representative
democracy. How that relevance should be admitted to judicial
deliberations is another question, one which I shall defer answering for
i. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY REMEMBERS: THE INFORMAL MEMOIRS OF FINLEY PETER
DUNNE 303 (Phillip Dunne ed., 1963).
2. See infra Appendix. State-by-state data is presented in a graph on file with the Hastings Law
Journal.
3. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 2 (1955)
("[The Supreme Court] is a unit of a complex, interdependent scheme of government from which it
cannot be severed. Nor can it be regarded merely as another law court."). Jackson's three lectures
bore the titles "The Supreme Court as a Unit of Government," "The Supreme Court as a Law Court,"
and "The Supreme Court as a Political Institution." Id. at i, 28, 534. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 54o0(1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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the moment. You might think that when judges are acting purely as
umpires in courts of law they should eschew public opinion and confine
themselves to legal analysis. But this is far too simple an answer. For one
thing, courts are never either solely a branch of government or a law
court; they are always and everywhere simultaneously both agents of
democratic governance and deciders of legal disputes.
So, how is one to break this particular Gordian knot? First, not all
problems brought to courts for decision share the same qualities. Some
issues of statutory interpretation may be resolved without considering
public opinion, except in the most remote sense. Surely I cannot deduct
from my income, as ordinary and necessary business expenses, veterinary
charges pertaining to my pet dog. But if I develop a comedy act as a
profitable sideline in which my pet dog is a star character, I may well be
able to deduct those veterinary expenses. The determination of whether
those expenses are ordinary and necessary business expenses does not
hinge on public opinion so much as it does upon well-developed criteria
concerning the revenue derived from the enterprise and the relationship
of the expenses to the business.5
While there may be statutory issues that do not implicate public
opinion very much, many such issues do involve public opinion. A tariff
that taxes imported fruits at one rate and vegetables at a different rate
might require a court to determine whether a tomato is a fruit or a
vegetable. It is a botanical fact that the tomato is the fruit of its plant, but
public opinion holds that it is a vegetable. Courts might refer to the
legislative history, and if that source tells us that the tomato is a
vegetable, the answer is surely shaped by public opinion. If the legislative
history is definite that the tomato is a fruit, courts might ignore contrary
public opinion, reasoning no doubt that the legislature can always correct
its popular error. But courts may just as easily impute to the legislature
an intention that corresponds to public opinion, even though that
intention lacks support in the legislative history.
There are even more familiar examples. A statute that directs courts
not to enforce unconscionable contracts requires courts to examine the
public understanding of that highly elastic term. A statute that requires
contracting parties to conduct themselves in good faith or a commercially
reasonable manner necessarily obligates the judicial interpreter to
inquire into the opinion of businessmen concerning what is commercially
reasonable, or to look to a broader social perception of conduct that is or
is not undertaken in good faith. 6
5. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 162, 212, 1402 (2oo6).
6. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §1995.260 (west 1985 & Supp. 2010) ("If a restriction on transfer of
the tenant's interest in a lease requires the landlord's consent for transfer but provides no standard for
giving or withholding consent, the restriction on transfer shall be construed to include an implied
standard that the landlord's consent may not be unreasonably withheld. whether the landlord's
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Consideration of public opinion also occurs when common law
principles are in question. Should contributory negligence be a complete
bar to recovery in tort? When the California Supreme Court decided that
the "all or nothing" rule of contributory negligence should be displaced
by pure comparative negligence,7 part of its rationale was the fact that
juries "allow recovery in cases of contributory negligence, and.. . the
compromise in the jury room does result in some diminution of the
damages because of the plaintiff's fault."' But some common law issues
are resolved by courts without much consideration of public opinion.
When the New Mexico Supreme Court decided that the common law
principle of destructibility of contingent remainders was not part of the
common law of New Mexico, 9 it mentioned only in passing that the rule
operated to destroy a grantor's intention; most of the court's rationale
was the thoroughgoing anachronism of the rule and the haphazard effect
of its continuation. 0 If public opinion had been the court's guide, the
rule's implacable destruction of a grantor's intention for no good reason
would have figured more prominently in its reasoning.
The role of public opinion in judicial decisions of constitutional
issues is particularly vexing. It is a hoary maxim that courts are expected
to protect constitutional liberties from majoritarian invasion." It is
equally axiomatic that majority sentiment, translated through our
democratically elected representatives, is entitled to govern those aspects
of our lives that are not protected by constitutional liberties. The
problem arises when courts are asked to veto governmental practices
consent has been unreasonably withheld in a particular case is a question of fact on which the tenant
has the burden of proof."). This provision codifies the rule of Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., which
held that the landlord's consent may be withheld only for commercially reasonable objections. 709
P.2d 837, 849 (Cal. 1985). Although the Kendall court provided some guidance as to what might or
might not constitute commercially reasonable objections, ultimately the question is one of fact in
which jurors are asked to assess commercial reasonableness in light of the social context in which that
practice occurs. See id. at 842, 845; see also U.C.C. § 2-302 (2005) (providing that a court may refuse to
enforce contract terms that are unconscionable as a matter of law). The comments to that section
instruct judges to determine that which is unconscionable "in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case," a standard that necessarily
invites inspection of commercial practices. Id. at cmt. i.
7. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1243 (Cal. 1975) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 1231 (quoting William Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. I, 4 (1953)).

9. Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz, 6oo P.2d 278, 281 (N.M. 1979).
io. Id. at 335 ("Because the doctrine of destructibility of contingent remainders is but a relic of
the feudal past, which has no justification or support in modern society, we decline to apply it in New
Mexico. As Justice Holmes put it: 'It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."' (quoting
Justice O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston
University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in io HA'~iv. L. Ray. 457, 469 (1897))).
II. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. So, 86 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
("The guarantees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against .. . majoritarian limitations on
individual liberty.").
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that have long been assumed to be constitutionally valid. Almost always,
these challenges implicate cultural practices. Can the scope of
constitutional liberties be determined without reference to strongly held
cultural notions? Conversely, should courts ignore public opinion about
cultural practices in deciding constitutional meaning?
Historical lessons provide contradictory answers. Consider Dred
Scott." At the time of the decision, public opinion about the cultural
practice of human slavery was intensely divided. Southerners, of course,
defended the odious practice on several levels, all of which we now
regard as bogus.' 3 Northern sentiment varied from passive toleration of
slavery to adamant advocacy of abolition. 4 But even Northerners who
tolerated slavery strongly resented its introduction into the western
territories, if only because of the competitive advantage afforded
slaveholders, who could derive the full value of slave labor while
undercutting the wages of free workers." The arid and abstract decision
of the Court in Dred Scott took little account of this divided public
opinion in concluding that slavery could not be barred from the
territories. 6 Yet, the Court asserted that it was examining public opinion
when it reasoned that black Americans could not be citizens:
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in
relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and
enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of
Independence, and when the Constitution of the United States was
framed and adopted. But the public history of every European nation
displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race,
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.... This
opinion was at that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of
the white race....
And in no nation was this opinion more firmly fixed or more
uniformly acted upon than by the English Government and English
people....
The opinion thus entertained and acted upon in England was
naturally impressed upon the colonies they founded on this side of the
Atlantic....

12.

Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 6o U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).

13. See AVERY CRAVEN, THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 151-74 (1957).
14. See RELIGION AND THE ANTEBELLUM DEBATE OVER SLAVERY 357 (John R. McKivigan &
Mitchell Snay eds., 1998); HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE

ISSUES INTHE LINCOLN DOUGLAS DEBATES 4 (Univ. or Chi. Press 1982).
15. See generally Exc FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE
REPUBLICAN PARTY

BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1995).

'6. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452.

MEN: THE IDEOLOGY

OF THE
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We refer to these historical facts for the purpose of showing the
fixed opinions concerning that race, upon which the statesmen of that
day spoke and acted. It is necessary to do this, in order to determine
whether the general terms used in the Constitution of the United
States, as to the rights of man and the rights of the people, was
intended to include them, or to give to them or their posterity the
benefit of any of its provisions.1
Of course, the conclusion drawn by the Court was that blacks were
never intended to be included as citizens of the United States. According
to the Court, the original intentions of the framers governed:
No one ... supposes that any change in public opinion or feeling, in
relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe or
in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the
Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were
intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted.... If
any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in
the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains
unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of
its adoption. It is not only the same in words, but the same in
meaning .... Any other rule of construction would abrogate the
judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the
popular opinion or passion of the day.
The irony is that the Court relied on public opinion to determine the
original intentions of the Constitution's Framers, but denied that public
opinion had any role to play in later interpretations of the Constitution's
text. Perhaps this is the logical result of a jurisprudence of original
intentions, but because we now declare that we are not bound inexorably
to original intentions (even if knowable) we are left with the question of
how much influence public opinion should have upon courts when
interpreting the Constitution in light of contemporary conditions.
Consider in this respect Plessy v. Ferguson." The Court was
required to determine whether a Louisiana law requiring racial
segregation in railroad coaches violated the equal protection guarantee.2
The Court said that the Equal Protection Clause requires every exercise
of the police power to be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and not for
the annoyance or oppression of a particular class:
[T]he question [is] whether the statute of Louisiana is a reasonable
regulation, and with respect to this there must necessarily be a large
discretion on the part of the legislature. In determining the question of
reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to the established

17. Id. at 407-09.

18. Id. at 426.
19. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
20. Id. at 540.
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usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the
promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace
and good order."
At the core of Plessy is the idea that the judiciary should defer
substantially to public opinion in determining the contours of
constitutional liberties. But that notion is also embedded in Brown v.
Board of Education," the case that repudiated Plessy. In Brown, a
unanimous Court declared,
We must consider public education in the light of its full development
and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in
this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
available to all on equal terms.
This conclusion was grounded on contemporary perceptions of the
effects of racial segregation:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when
it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is
usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. .a.."
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at
the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern

authority. 4
2

While such perceptions were ostensibly those of psychologists and
judges, underlying Brown was a shift in public opinion concerning racial
segregation. In 1942, only forty-two percent of American whites thought
blacks to be as intelligent as whites; by January 1956, seventy-eight
percent of whites considered blacks to be as intelligent as whites. 5 In
1942 only thirty percent of white adults thought blacks and whites should

Id. at 550.
347 U.S. 483 (15).
23. Id.at 492-93.
24. Id. at 494 (quoting one of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas's findings
21.

22.

of fact).
25. Hazel Gaudet Erskine, The Pols: Race Relations, 26 Pua. OPINION

0.

137, 138 (1962).
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be schooled together; but by 1954, when Brown was decided, fifty-four
percent of Americans nationally agreed with the decision, and sixty-four
percent of Americans outside of the South agreed with Brown. While it
is true that seventy-one percent of Southerners disagreed with the
decision," the polling data suggest that the Court in Brown was staking
out a position consistent with public opinion in most of the nation. The
Court was aware of public opinion; it just did not refer to it explicitly as a
basis for its decision.
Critics may counter that when the Supreme Court decided Loving v.
28
in 967, most Americans were opposed to interracial
Virg
marriages. It is true that a Gallup poll conducted in late June of 1968
revealed that seventy-three percent of Americans disapproved of
marriage between whites and blacks.29 Only twenty percent approved of
such marriages. 0 What this data does not reveal is the proportion of
Americans in the mid-sixties who thought that interracial marriages
ought to be prohibited by law. It is entirely possible that a majority of
Americans could disapprove of interracial marriage, yet still think that
such marriages should be legally available to those who wish to enter into
them. Indeed, that conclusion is bolstered by the fact that, at the time of
the Loving decision, only sixteen states had laws prohibiting interracial
marriages, and all of them were Southern states where racial segregation
had made its last stand.3
Putting history aside, what criteria ought to be relevant to the
question of when the Court should consider public opinion in
interpreting the Constitution? Because constitutional rights are
frequently expressed in general and abstract terms, there must
necessarily be some rules to implement those guarantees. The meanings
of such terms as "cruel and unusual," "due process of law," and "equal
protection of the laws" are so far from self-evident that courts are
required to create an elaborate maze of constitutional decision rules to
determine when those guarantees have been abridged. 2 The difficulty is
compounded when these guarantees are invoked to protect behavior that

26. Id. at 139-40. Six years before Brown was decided the armed services had been desegregated
by executive order of President Truman. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). The
effect of this political action on public opinion, taken at a time when white opinion of blacks was still
riddled with considerable prejudice, is difficult to pinpoint, but must be thought to have had some
influence.
27. Erskine, supra note 25, at 34o.

28. 3 88 U.S. i.
29. Joseph Carroll, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Marriages, GALLUP, Aug. 16, 2007,
(discussing a poll
http://www.gallup.coM/poll/28417/most-americans-approve-interracial-marriages.aspx
in 1968 that asked, "Do you approve or disapprove of marriage between blacks and whites?").
30. Id.
31I. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 & n.532. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, ConstitutionalDecision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. I, 6--7 (2004).
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is at odds with long-settled cultural norms. That was surely an aspect of
the Court's reaction to the challenge posed by Homer Plessy. Of course,
we now abhor the cultural norm accepted by the Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson, but that is because the cultural norm has thoroughly changed
since that time. Moral philosophers who believe in absolute and
universal truth may claim that racial segregation was always morally
repugnant, but moral relativists must admit that what seemed true then is
a lie today.33 Whatever may be the resolution of the arguments from
moral philosophy, there can be little doubt that the cultural norms of
1896 and 201o are vastly different.
When entrenched cultural practices are under assault there are
multiple fronts in the resulting culture war. The most significant front is
social-the attitudes and assumptions of the people who compose the
culture and thus fashion the cultural norms-but another front is legal.
The legal front takes two forms: pressure for change to statutes that
codify existing cultural practices or which assume their existence, and
pressure for invalidation of such statutes in order to vindicate paramount
constitutional liberties. I am only concerned here with the influence of
public opinion on the judicial process by which constitutional liberties
are ascertained. Because the content of constitutional liberties is
malleable, arguments about the proper application of these liberties take
many forms-doctrinal or precedential, prudential, historical, structural,
textual, and (most importantly for our present purposes) cultural.3 4
The question of whether limiting marriage to two partners of the
opposite sex is constitutionally valid implicates most of these modes of
constitutional reasoning, but has a particularly strong cultural element.
To see this, first consider the argument that relies on precedent in the
form of Loving v. Virginia." In striking down Virginia's law making
interracial marriage a crime, the Supreme Court declared that the
"freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness," and characterized
the right to marry as a "fundamental freedom."3 6 Later cases, such as
Zablocki v. Redhail, have held that laws that significantly interfere with
the exercise of the right to marry "must be subjected to rigorous
scrutiny."" But the cultural assumption that undergirds these decisions
from the 1960s and 1970s is that marriage is an institution between one
man and one woman. Same-sex marriage advocates challenge that
cultural assumption, but when they rely upon such cases as Loving and

33. Cf ERNEST HEMINGWAY, TRUE AT FIRST LIGHT 5 (Scribner 1999) ("In Africa a thing is true at

first light and a lie by noon.").
34. See generally PHILIP BOBBITn,

35. 388 U.S. i (1967).
36. Id. at 32.
37. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).

CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (3984).
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Zablocki, they invoke cases that implicitly incorporate the very
assumption that they challenge.
Precedent supports the constitutional argument for same-sex
marriage only if the precedents are stripped of their cultural context.
This is a possible move, of course, because the text of those precedents
(especially Loving) is couched at a high enough level of generality to
support any cultural conception of marriage, whether it be same-sex
marriage, polygamy, or any other arrangement. But such a move is
myopic: constitutional interpretations that are premised upon universally
observed cultural practices cannot be divorced from their foundational
premise.3

While some might argue that constitutional challenges that seek to
extend rights to a group previously denied such rights must necessarily
use precedent that incorporates the very assumptions that they challenge,
this is not so. The challenges to racial segregation that culminated in
Brown v. Board of Education39 are claimed to be an example. Yet, the
strategy of the lawyers challenging racial segregation was not to attack
separate-but-equal as inherently unequal but was to attack the "equal"
prong of Plessy's separate-but-equal mantra in a series of as-applied
challenges.40 Eventually, of course, separate-but-equal was revealed as
38. An analogous problem occurs when one attempts to state the level of generality at which a
claimed unwritten constitutional right should be pitched. A good example is Michael H. v. Gerald D.,
which involved the question of whether California's conclusive presumption that the husband is the
father of a child born into an extant marriage violated the claimed constitutional right of the biological
father (a stranger to the marriage) to maintain contact with his child. 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989). The
Court upheld the validity of the presumption, and a plurality of four justices looked to historical
traditions concerning the rights of adulterous natural fathers to maintain contact with their offspring to
determine that the natural father's claimed right was not constitutionally fundamental. Id. at 122-27.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that the natural father was given a full and
fair opportunity to prove that the best interests of the child would be served by granting him visitation
rights. Id. at 133-34. Of special interest was the dismissal of the dissent's methodology by Justice
Scalia:
Justice Brennan criticizes our methodology in using historical traditions specifically
relating to the rights of an adulterous natural father, rather than inquiring more generally
"whether parenthood is an interest that historically has received our attention and
protection." . . .
We do not understand why, having rejected our focus upon the societal tradition
regarding the natural father's rights vis-A-vis a child whose mother is married to another
man, Justice Brennan would choose to focus instead upon "parenthood." Why should the
relevant category not be even more general-perhaps "family relationships"; or "personal
relationships"; or even "emotional attachments in general"? Though the dissent has no basis
for the level of generality it would select, we do: We refer to the most specific level at which
a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.
Id. at 127-28 n.6 (quoting id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. See, eg, RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 354-57 (i1975); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents
for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 642 (5950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631-36 (1950); Mo. ax ret
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 35'I (1938).
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the falsehood it always was, and Brown was its unmasking.41 But that
strategy used precedent in a very different way-by exposing its flawed
assumptions rather than relying on them to prove the death of the
assumptions upon which reliance was placed.
In any case, reliance on precedent to support same-sex marriage, at
least in the lower federal courts, is dangerous. In Baker v. Nelson, the
Supreme Court summarily dismissed an appeal from the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision that Minnesota's limitation of marriage to
opposite-sex partners was constitutionally valid.42 Because the summary
disposition was of a case within the Court's appellate jurisdiction, rather
than a mere denial of certiorari, the Court's disposition was on the merits
and therefore constitutes binding precedent.43 The scope of that
precedent is uncertain, however, 4 and thus not an insuperable obstacle to
the goal of obtaining a judicial decision that prohibitions of same-sex
marriage violate either or both of equal protection and due process.
Our focus is public opinion, so let us not be unduly preoccupied with
arguments about precedent. Let us grant the premise that the Court is
aware of and to some extent responsive to public opinion when
constitutional interpretation involves breaking with settled cultural
norms; what is public opinion about the nature of marriage?

41. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
42. 409 U.S. 81o, 8xo (1972).

43. See, e.g., Pamela R. Winnick, Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the
Supreme Courtfor Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v. Miranda, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 5o8, 511 (1976) ("[A] dismissal by the Supreme Court is an adjudication on the
merits ..... [A] lower federal court must consider itself bound by the dismissal when a similar
challenge comes before it."). But see EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE ch. 5.17, at

365 (9th ed. 2007) ("[T]he Court has become increasingly concerned that these summary dispositions
on the merits are uncertain guides to the lower courts bound to follow them and not infrequently
create more confusion than coherence in the development of the law."). Note also that the Court, in
Edelman v. Jordan, held that summary dispositions, while of some precedential value, are not
considered as binding on the Court as a holding on the merits:
Equally obviously, they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of
this Court treating the question on the merits. Since we deal with a constitutional question,
we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas of the law.
415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).

44. The precedential effect of summary dismissals is limited to cases presenting materially
indistinguishable facts and the same constitutional questions. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173,
176-77 (1977); id at 18o (Brennan, J., concurring). However, if subsequent doctrinal developments are
contrary to the prior summary disposition, the precedential effect of the summary disposition is
diminished. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) ("[T]f the Court has branded a question as
unsubstantial, it remains so except when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise." (quoting Port
Auth. Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 387 F.2d 259, 263 n-3 (2d Cir. 1967))).
The foregoing statement must be qualified by the Court's declaration in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.: "Ifa precedent of this Court has direct application ina case, yet
appears to rest on reasons rejected insome other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow
the case which directly controls, leaving to this
Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions."
490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
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The answer is not clear. On one hand, thirty-one states have now
rejected same-sex marriage at the ballot box.45 Only five states-Iowa,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut-permit
same-sex marriage,46 and four of those states did so through judicial
decision based on the state constitution. 7 If public opinion as measured
by ballot results is the determining factor, we should expect the Court to
reject claims that equal protection or substantive due process require
states to extend marriage to same-sex couples.t
But that is not the end of the public opinion story. Political scientists
Jeffrey Lax and Justin Phillips have assembled data comparing public
opinion in each of the states on policy issues of concern to gays and
lesbians and the adoption of those policies by the relevant states. 4 9 The
policy issues are job and housing discrimination, health benefits for
same-sex partners, adoption of a partner's child by the other same-sex
partner, hate crime legislation, civil unions, and marriage. In general,
states lag behind public opinion in adopting policies sought by gay and
lesbian interests other than those concerning marriage. Of specific
interest to this discussion is public opinion on marriage and civil unions.
In only six states does public opinion support same-sex marriage. Rhode
45. See Abby Goodnough, A Setback in Maine for Gay Marriage, but Medical Marijuana Law
Expands,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov.
5,
2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo9/1 1/o5/us/politics/
o5maine.html? r= i&scp= i&sq= Maine%2oVoters%2oRepeal%2oLaw%2oAllowing%2oGay%2oMar
riage%20&st=cse.

46. Id.
47. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 482 (Conn. 2oo8); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968-70 (Mass.
2oo3). In Baker v. State, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that the Vermont Constitution required
that same-sex couples receive the same legal status benefits as married couples. 744 A.2d 864, 886-87
(Vt. 1999). In response, the Vermont legislature created civil unions. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§§ 1201-1206 (2002 & Supp. 2009). In 2009, Vermont amended its definition of marriage, "Marriage is
the legally recognized union of one man and one woman," to read, "Marriage is the legally recognized
union of two people." See id. § 8 (2002 & Supp. 2009). Whether Vermont would have done so without
the initial impetus of the Vermont Supreme Court is a matter of speculation.
48. Some might object that public opinion should be assessed by the population represented by
the states rather than the absolute number of states. This is not unreasonable, but if population is to be
the criteria then one must delve further into the total number of voters arrayed on either side of
various issues. This can be done, but I am not sure the result is worth the effort. Many of the states
that have rejected same-sex marriage have done so by wide margins; some. like California, have been
more evenly divided; and some states have not submitted this issue to the ballot. See, e.g., Kavan
Peterson, 5o-State Rundown on Gay Marriage Laws, STATELINE.O
Nov. 3, 2oo4. httpl/www.stateline.orgflive/
ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageld= i&contentld=15576 (cataloguing these actions). A
careful calibration of public sentiment would be essential if public opinion is the sole criterion of
decision, but that is neither what I contend is nor should be the case. The number of states that have
rejected same-sex marriage in the polling booth is a rough measure of public opinion, and that is good
enough for purposes of broadly gauging public attitudes as a data point that is relevant but by no
means dispositive.
49. See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and Policy
Responsiveness, 1o3 AM. POL. Scn. REv. 367, 367-86 (2009). This data is represented graphically in a
chart on file with the Hastings Law Journal.See infra Appendix.
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Island and New York are the only states where the majority of the public
favors same-sex marriage but which have not adopted that policy. Iowa is
the only state that recognizes same-sex marriage despite public opinion
opposed to that policy. However, public opinion in twenty states favors
civil unions, while only eleven states have adopted civil union statutes.o
What are we to make of this? Perhaps some illumination is to be
had in the tale of Bowers v. Hardwick' and its repudiation by Lawrence
v. Texas." At the time Bowers was decided, about two-thirds of the
public supported criminal sanctions against homosexual sexual activity,
but by the time Lawrence was decided only about one-third of the nation
approved of such criminal sanctions." And in the course of his opinion
for the Court in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy noted that since Bowers was
decided, the number of states with criminal penalties for same-sex sexual
intimacies had been reduced from twenty-five to thirteen, "of which 4
enforce their laws only against homosexual conduct."5 4
Public opinion matters to constitutional interpretation. Public
opinion matters the most when the constitutional question hinges on
alteration or non-recognition of well-established cultural patterns. As a
predictive matter, the Court is unlikely to embrace same-sex marriage as
a constitutional right unless it is reasonably satisfied that public opinion
comports with that judgment.
No matter how much public opinion may influence any decision of
the Supreme Court, it is not likely to openly acknowledge this as the
basis of its decision. The influence of public opinion may be manifested
in several ways. The Court may not grant certiorari. Assume that the
four "liberals" (Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor) are
predisposed to find that the Constitution bars states from limiting
marriage to heterosexual couples, and that the four "conservatives"
(Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) are disinclined to do so. It is
entirely possible that each camp would eye the "centrist" Justice
Kennedy warily. The conservatives would recall that Kennedy authored
the Court's opinion in Romer v. Evans" and Lawrence v. Texas; 6 the
liberals would recall Kennedy's disclaimer in Lawrence that the case did
"not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to
any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter."" Moreover, the
liberals may well recall the burst of popular repudiation of same-sex
50. See infra Appendix.

51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
52. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
53. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 359-61 & n.363 (2009).
54. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
55 517 U.S. 620, 623 ('996) (striking down an amendment to Colorado's constitution designed to

prevent the recognition of homosexuals as a protected class).
56. 539 U.S. 558.
57. Id. at578.
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marriage and its presumed advocates in the Democratic Party that
followed the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision to grant
marriage rights to same-sex couples in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health." As a result, the four conservatives might vote against
granting review (out of fear that Kennedy will desert them) and the four
liberals might vote against granting review (out of the same fear plus the
concern that a popular backlash will smite both the Court and their
ideological kin). In this scenario only Justice Kennedy would vote to
review the case.
If the Court should reach the merits of the matter, its deference to
public opinion might be manifested by an opinion that contains the
following key elements. Concerning equal protection, the majority would
reiterate that classifications drawn on sexual orientation do not trigger
heightened scrutiny.59 The majority might contend that whether or not
sexual orientation is immutable, the trait is not readily observable and, in
any case, gays and lesbians have considerable access to political power.
The majority might also find that state polities have a legitimate interest
in officially recognizing deeply entrenched and still widely-accepted
cultural practices surrounding marriage. In a country dedicated to the
principle of popular sovereignty, the majority might say, radical cultural
alterations are primarily the responsibility of the people themselves. The
states should remain free to decide whether to jettison old cultural mores
and embrace new ones, at least until a national consensus is formed.
Limiting marriage to heterosexual couples could be described as
rationally related to this end. As to the due process argument, the Court
might observe that Lawrence applied minimal scrutiny because it struck
down the Texas law for want of a legitimate state interest." The Court
could then observe that the declaration in Loving that the right to enter
into marriage is a constitutionally fundamental right was premised on an
understanding that marriage was a relationship between one man and
one woman, and the argument to the contrary was rejected by the Court
in Baker v. Nelson. Applying minimal scrutiny, the majority could restate
its conclusions concerning the legitimate governmental objective of
recognizing deeply held cultural norms and the rational relationship to
that end of limiting marriage to heterosexual couples.
But when should the Court consider public opinion? When
constitutional answers turn on long-entrenched cultural norms, the Court

58. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Disputations: Learning From Prop. 8,
NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 2008, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/disputations-learning-prop-8, Jeffrey
Rosen, Justice Delayed, NEw REPUBLIC, June ii, 2008, at 9, 9. available at http://www.tnr.com/article/

justice-delayed-i.
59. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 (applying minimal scrutiny); Rorer, 517 U.S. 620
(same).
6o. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
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should be attentive to public opinion about those norms. This is not to
say that the Court should pay attention to transitory fashions and the
fickle whims of the public. Whatever may be public opinion about
droopy but non-obscene trousers,6 ' the question of whether there is a
protected right of expression or a fundamental liberty interest in
selecting one's apparel is one that should be answered without much
consideration of public opinion.6 There is no deeply-entrenched norm
about apparel, apart from the near-universally held view that clothing
should cover the erogenous zones. But the question of whether to
mandate a significant change in the culture's understanding of marriage
is another matter. Marriage has been a fundamental organizing cultural
principle for millennia, and the conception of marriage as a nominally
monogamous union of one man and one woman has been a fundamental
cultural principle of America since its settlement by Europeans. A
redefinition of marriage to include same-sex unions is an enormous
cultural change, a cultural seismic event. Such cultural upheavals are best
left for the people to decide, through their usual methods of assessment
of cultural propriety. That is what is happening in America. At the
moment, some pockets of American culture, like San Francisco, embrace
same-sex marriage, while other cultural enclaves strongly resist this
change in the cultural understanding of marriage. It may well be that the
culture as a whole will eventually perceive marriage to include same-sex
partners. When that happens, the vestigial barriers to same-sex marriages
will be stricken as inconsistent with constitutional guarantees of liberty
and equal protection. That process of constitutional development
recognizes that when the Constitution is invoked to compel major
cultural change, the force of the argument depends on the degree to
which the society has adopted that cultural change. The Court is a
political actor as well as a law court. Its ability to impose political
judgments as constitutional commands depends on voluntary
acquiescence to its decrees. Expenditure of its political capital in
opposition to popular understanding of long-held and deeply entrenched
cultural practices is a dangerous business. The Court has no sword, and if
it waves a rubber blade around it will be seen as the feeble institution it is
when it lacks the voluntary compliance of other political actors.

61. See, e.g., Edmund Newton, Ban on Drooping Drawers Faces Legal Challenge, N.Y.

TIMES,

Apr. 12, 2009, at AI2.
62. Professor Eugene Volokh, of UCLA School of Law, has expressed his opinion about the

dubious validity of such laws. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/
2oo7/o8/24/atlanta-councilmembers-propose-ban-on-baggy-pants/ (Aug. 24, 2007, 17:30 PST).
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APPENDIX

On file with the Hastings Law Journal is a graph that contains data
from Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public
Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 367, 367-386
(2009). The graph is from Catherine Rampell, Does Policy Trail Public
Opinion on Gay Rights?, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 27, 2009, http://economix.
blogs.nytimes.com/2009/Io/27/does-policy-trail-public-opinion-on-gayrights/?scp=2&sq=liptak&st=cse.
In the graph, the vertical axis presents each of the fifty states. The
horizontal axis represents the portion of the public in any given state that
supports each of seven different rights: same-sex marriage, civil unions,
health benefits for same-sex partners, second parent adoption for samesex couples, job discrimination, housing discrimination, and hate crime
protection. Public opinion with respect to each right is depicted by a
different color circle. A dotted vertical line represents evenly-divided
public opinion on any particular issue concerning homosexuals. Circles to
the left of the line represent public opinion opposed to the particular
claimed right; circles to the right of the line represent public opinion in
favor of the particular right. Solid circles in different colors represent
policies that have been adopted by the state in question; the open circles
represent policies that have not been adopted. It is noteworthy that there
are many more open circles to the right of the vertical line (denoting
policies that the public in that state favors but which have not been
adopted) than there are solid circles to the left of the line (denoting
policies that have been adopted despite public disfavor of such policies).
On same-sex marriage, Rhode Island and New York are the only states
where public opinion favors same-sex marriage but which have not
adopted that policy. Iowa is the only state that recognizes same-sex
marriage despite public opinion opposed to that policy. Because the data
was assembled after Maine's legislature had adopted same sex marriage
but prior to the November 2009 election, Maine is shown as recognizing
same-sex marriage despite public opposition. In that election, Maine
voters rejected same-sex marriage. According to the data assembled by
Lax and Phillips, public opinion in only one in six states supports samesex marriage.

